Baywood Publishing Company
0047-2433
1541-3802
Journal of Environmental Systems
BWES
300323
http://baywood.metapress.com/link.asp?target=journal&id=300323
11
2
2
0
0
0
000011000219810101
Number 2 / 1981-82
X36UCVP8NCBP
http://baywood.metapress.com/link.asp?target=issue&id=X36UCVP8NCBP
10.2190/T73T-MCXL-EN7M-5CXA
T73TMCXLEN7M5CXA
2
Do Public and Private Interests in Pollution Control Always Conflict?
113
123
20020509
20020509
20020509
20020509
T73TMCXLEN7M5CXA.pdf
http://baywood.metapress.com/link.asp?target=contribution&id=T73TMCXLEN7M5CXA
2
Ann
Fisher
Robert
L.
Greene
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Traditional economic theory finds the pollution control interests of environmentalists and regulators to be in conflict with the profit-motivated decisions by businessmen. However, the usual assumptions about the relative shapes and positions of the marginal social benefit curve and marginal social cost curve for a cleaner environment may not always be realistic. This article examines the conditions under which the interests of environmentalists and regulators would coincide, rather than conflict, with those of businessmen. In these cases, reducing pollution control from suboptimal levels improves both public welfare and private profit.