MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES: THE VIEW FROM THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES J. COLEMAN
GEORGE M. PANGIS


DOI: 10.2190/QUA1-CDTD-GHNL-76GB

Abstract

In 1991, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vaulted to a position of leadership in cases involving mandatory arbitration of statutory disputes when the Supreme Court upheld the decision made by that circuit in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. [1]. In that case, the Fourth Circuit stood alone in holding that 1) statutory claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) may be subject to an arbitration agreement signed at the time of a person's employment; and 2) such an agreement may be enforced under the terms of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA) [2]. In subsequent years, the Gilmer decision has been extended by the entire judiciary to a vast array of cases involving a variety of statutes. The Fourth Circuit has decided a number of these cases, sometimes leading the other circuits, sometimes following them, sometimes affirmed by the Supreme Court, and sometimes reversed. This article examines those decisions and provides an assessment of the role that has been played by the Fourth Circuit on this topic.

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