CENTRALIZATION OR DECENTRALIZATION OF BARGAINING AMONG STATE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE OPTIONS

MARK A. HASKELL


DOI: 10.2190/4FRH-0X85-VY4H-GWBL

Abstract

The author examines the strengths and weaknesses of various centralized and decentralized bargaining configurations among state government employees. He concludes that a trade-off of benefits between the two extreme models can be avoided by opting for a multi-tier structure which would centralize bargaining on major economic items, but would permit localized negotiations on issues of importance to local units. In this way, democratic decision-making and appropriate attention to minority needs can be made compatible with the efficiency and uniform treatment connected with centralized collective bargaining.

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