Journal Facts

Journal
Journal of Collective Negotiations
ISSN
2167-7816 (print) 2167-7824 (electronic)
Volume
28
Issue
1
Date
3/1/1999

Article Facts

Title
Bargaining Laws and Union Density in the Civil Service: The Japanese Paradox
DOI
10.2190/1CPR-QEQ6-MP0J-8Q9C
Author
Francois Simard
Pages
17-28
Online Date
05/09/2002

Article Links

Bargaining Laws and Union Density in the Civil Service: The Japanese Paradox

Francois Simard

DOI: 10.2190/1CPR-QEQ6-MP0J-8Q9C

Abstract

A substantial body of literature has shown that in advanced industrialized countries the legal rules governing labor relations have a strong impact on union density and this relationship is strongly associated to the relationship between perceived instrumentality and union density. But there are a few cases of strong unions despite unfavorable rules. The Japanese civil service is one of these cases. Despite a level of union security reduced to the minimum, without the right to strike or to sign collective agreements and with a very restricted scope of negotiation, the Japanese civil service has a relatively high union density. Focusing on decision making concerning staff numbers, this research shows Japanese civil service unions have found ways of influencing decision makers without directly challenging the rules, making these unions more relevant than they appear to be.

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